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Bargaining with an agenda

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<mark>Journal publication date</mark>07/2004
<mark>Journal</mark>Games and Economic Behavior
Issue number1
Number of pages15
Pages (from-to)139-153
Publication StatusPublished
<mark>Original language</mark>English


Gradual bargaining is represented by an agenda: A family of increasing sets of joint utilities, parameterized by time. A solution for gradual bargaining specifies an agreement at each time. We axiomatize an ordinal solution, i.e., one that is covariant with order-preserving transformations of utility. It can be viewed as the limit of step-by-step bargaining in which the agreement of the last negotiation becomes the disagreement point for the next. The stepwise agreements may follow the Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution or many others and still yield the ordinal solution in the limit. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.