Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Bargaining with an agenda
AU - O'Neill, B.
AU - Samet, D.
AU - Wiener, Z.
AU - Winter, E.
PY - 2004/7
Y1 - 2004/7
N2 - Gradual bargaining is represented by an agenda: A family of increasing sets of joint utilities, parameterized by time. A solution for gradual bargaining specifies an agreement at each time. We axiomatize an ordinal solution, i.e., one that is covariant with order-preserving transformations of utility. It can be viewed as the limit of step-by-step bargaining in which the agreement of the last negotiation becomes the disagreement point for the next. The stepwise agreements may follow the Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution or many others and still yield the ordinal solution in the limit. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
AB - Gradual bargaining is represented by an agenda: A family of increasing sets of joint utilities, parameterized by time. A solution for gradual bargaining specifies an agreement at each time. We axiomatize an ordinal solution, i.e., one that is covariant with order-preserving transformations of utility. It can be viewed as the limit of step-by-step bargaining in which the agreement of the last negotiation becomes the disagreement point for the next. The stepwise agreements may follow the Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution or many others and still yield the ordinal solution in the limit. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
KW - Gradual bargaining
KW - Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
KW - Nash bargaining solution
KW - Ordinal solution
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2003.07.002
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2003.07.002
M3 - Journal article
VL - 48
SP - 139
EP - 153
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
SN - 0899-8256
IS - 1
ER -