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Bargaining with an agenda

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Bargaining with an agenda. / O'Neill, B.; Samet, D.; Wiener, Z. et al.
In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 48, No. 1, 07.2004, p. 139-153.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

O'Neill, B, Samet, D, Wiener, Z & Winter, E 2004, 'Bargaining with an agenda', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 139-153. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.07.002

APA

O'Neill, B., Samet, D., Wiener, Z., & Winter, E. (2004). Bargaining with an agenda. Games and Economic Behavior, 48(1), 139-153. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.07.002

Vancouver

O'Neill B, Samet D, Wiener Z, Winter E. Bargaining with an agenda. Games and Economic Behavior. 2004 Jul;48(1):139-153. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.07.002

Author

O'Neill, B. ; Samet, D. ; Wiener, Z. et al. / Bargaining with an agenda. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2004 ; Vol. 48, No. 1. pp. 139-153.

Bibtex

@article{1c50b8b1ef424636ae0d4415e92a9d3d,
title = "Bargaining with an agenda",
abstract = "Gradual bargaining is represented by an agenda: A family of increasing sets of joint utilities, parameterized by time. A solution for gradual bargaining specifies an agreement at each time. We axiomatize an ordinal solution, i.e., one that is covariant with order-preserving transformations of utility. It can be viewed as the limit of step-by-step bargaining in which the agreement of the last negotiation becomes the disagreement point for the next. The stepwise agreements may follow the Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution or many others and still yield the ordinal solution in the limit. {\textcopyright} 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.",
keywords = "Gradual bargaining, Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, Nash bargaining solution, Ordinal solution",
author = "B. O'Neill and D. Samet and Z. Wiener and E. Winter",
year = "2004",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2003.07.002",
language = "English",
volume = "48",
pages = "139--153",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "ELSEVIER ACADEMIC PRESS INC",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Bargaining with an agenda

AU - O'Neill, B.

AU - Samet, D.

AU - Wiener, Z.

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 2004/7

Y1 - 2004/7

N2 - Gradual bargaining is represented by an agenda: A family of increasing sets of joint utilities, parameterized by time. A solution for gradual bargaining specifies an agreement at each time. We axiomatize an ordinal solution, i.e., one that is covariant with order-preserving transformations of utility. It can be viewed as the limit of step-by-step bargaining in which the agreement of the last negotiation becomes the disagreement point for the next. The stepwise agreements may follow the Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution or many others and still yield the ordinal solution in the limit. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

AB - Gradual bargaining is represented by an agenda: A family of increasing sets of joint utilities, parameterized by time. A solution for gradual bargaining specifies an agreement at each time. We axiomatize an ordinal solution, i.e., one that is covariant with order-preserving transformations of utility. It can be viewed as the limit of step-by-step bargaining in which the agreement of the last negotiation becomes the disagreement point for the next. The stepwise agreements may follow the Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution or many others and still yield the ordinal solution in the limit. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

KW - Gradual bargaining

KW - Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

KW - Nash bargaining solution

KW - Ordinal solution

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2003.07.002

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2003.07.002

M3 - Journal article

VL - 48

SP - 139

EP - 153

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

IS - 1

ER -