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Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

<mark>Journal publication date</mark>10/2018
<mark>Journal</mark>Public Choice
Issue number1-2
Number of pages14
Pages (from-to)53-66
Publication StatusPublished
Early online date18/07/18
<mark>Original language</mark>English


We study the equilibria of the standard pivotal-voter participation game between two groups of voters of asymmetric sizes (majority and minority), as originally proposed by Palfrey and Rosenthal (Public Choice 41(1):7–53, 1983). We find a unique equilibrium wherein the minority votes with certainty and the majority votes with probability in (0, 1); we prove that this is the only equilibrium in which voters of only one group play a pure strategy, and we provide sufficient conditions for its existence. Equilibria where voters of both groups vote with probability in (0, 1) are analyzed numerically.