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Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size

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Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size. / Mavridis, Christos; Serena, Marco.
In: Public Choice, Vol. 177, No. 1-2, 10.2018, p. 53-66.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Mavridis, C & Serena, M 2018, 'Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size', Public Choice, vol. 177, no. 1-2, pp. 53-66. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0585-6

APA

Mavridis, C., & Serena, M. (2018). Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size. Public Choice, 177(1-2), 53-66. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0585-6

Vancouver

Mavridis C, Serena M. Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size. Public Choice. 2018 Oct;177(1-2):53-66. Epub 2018 Jul 18. doi: 10.1007/s11127-018-0585-6

Author

Mavridis, Christos ; Serena, Marco. / Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size. In: Public Choice. 2018 ; Vol. 177, No. 1-2. pp. 53-66.

Bibtex

@article{4b5634ff52ea46c6a047edcfd8e10654,
title = "Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size",
abstract = "We study the equilibria of the standard pivotal-voter participation game between two groups of voters of asymmetric sizes (majority and minority), as originally proposed by Palfrey and Rosenthal (Public Choice 41(1):7–53, 1983). We find a unique equilibrium wherein the minority votes with certainty and the majority votes with probability in (0, 1); we prove that this is the only equilibrium in which voters of only one group play a pure strategy, and we provide sufficient conditions for its existence. Equilibria where voters of both groups vote with probability in (0, 1) are analyzed numerically.",
keywords = "Costly voting, Pivotal voter model , Complete information ",
author = "Christos Mavridis and Marco Serena",
year = "2018",
month = oct,
doi = "10.1007/s11127-018-0585-6",
language = "English",
volume = "177",
pages = "53--66",
journal = "Public Choice",
issn = "0048-5829",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "1-2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size

AU - Mavridis, Christos

AU - Serena, Marco

PY - 2018/10

Y1 - 2018/10

N2 - We study the equilibria of the standard pivotal-voter participation game between two groups of voters of asymmetric sizes (majority and minority), as originally proposed by Palfrey and Rosenthal (Public Choice 41(1):7–53, 1983). We find a unique equilibrium wherein the minority votes with certainty and the majority votes with probability in (0, 1); we prove that this is the only equilibrium in which voters of only one group play a pure strategy, and we provide sufficient conditions for its existence. Equilibria where voters of both groups vote with probability in (0, 1) are analyzed numerically.

AB - We study the equilibria of the standard pivotal-voter participation game between two groups of voters of asymmetric sizes (majority and minority), as originally proposed by Palfrey and Rosenthal (Public Choice 41(1):7–53, 1983). We find a unique equilibrium wherein the minority votes with certainty and the majority votes with probability in (0, 1); we prove that this is the only equilibrium in which voters of only one group play a pure strategy, and we provide sufficient conditions for its existence. Equilibria where voters of both groups vote with probability in (0, 1) are analyzed numerically.

KW - Costly voting

KW - Pivotal voter model

KW - Complete information

U2 - 10.1007/s11127-018-0585-6

DO - 10.1007/s11127-018-0585-6

M3 - Journal article

VL - 177

SP - 53

EP - 66

JO - Public Choice

JF - Public Choice

SN - 0048-5829

IS - 1-2

ER -