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Contests on Networks

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Contests on Networks. / Matros, Alexander; Rietzke, David.
In: Economic Theory, Vol. 78, No. 3, 30.11.2024, p. 815-841.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Matros, A & Rietzke, D 2024, 'Contests on Networks', Economic Theory, vol. 78, no. 3, pp. 815-841. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01562-z

APA

Matros, A., & Rietzke, D. (2024). Contests on Networks. Economic Theory, 78(3), 815-841. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01562-z

Vancouver

Matros A, Rietzke D. Contests on Networks. Economic Theory. 2024 Nov 30;78(3):815-841. Epub 2024 Mar 21. doi: 10.1007/s00199-024-01562-z

Author

Matros, Alexander ; Rietzke, David. / Contests on Networks. In: Economic Theory. 2024 ; Vol. 78, No. 3. pp. 815-841.

Bibtex

@article{d97cf0652504488181c95362a14b7f1b,
title = "Contests on Networks",
abstract = "We develop a model of contests on networks. Each player is connected to a set of contests and exerts a single effort to increase the probability of winning each contest to which she is connected. We explore how behavior is shaped by the pattern of interactions and characterize the networks that tend to induce greater effort; in particular, we show that the complete bipartite network is the unique structure that maximizes aggregate player effort. We also obtain a new exclusion result—akin to the Exclusion Principle of Baye et al. (Am Econ Rev 83(1):289-294, 1993)—which holds under the lottery CSF, and contrasts prior work in contests. Finally, new insight into uniqueness of equilibrium for network contest games is provided. Our framework has a broad range of applications, including research and development, advertising, and research funding.",
keywords = "Bipartite graph, C72, Contests, D70, D85, Exclusion principle, Network games, Tullock contest",
author = "Alexander Matros and David Rietzke",
year = "2024",
month = nov,
day = "30",
doi = "10.1007/s00199-024-01562-z",
language = "English",
volume = "78",
pages = "815--841",
journal = "Economic Theory",
issn = "0938-2259",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag,",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Contests on Networks

AU - Matros, Alexander

AU - Rietzke, David

PY - 2024/11/30

Y1 - 2024/11/30

N2 - We develop a model of contests on networks. Each player is connected to a set of contests and exerts a single effort to increase the probability of winning each contest to which she is connected. We explore how behavior is shaped by the pattern of interactions and characterize the networks that tend to induce greater effort; in particular, we show that the complete bipartite network is the unique structure that maximizes aggregate player effort. We also obtain a new exclusion result—akin to the Exclusion Principle of Baye et al. (Am Econ Rev 83(1):289-294, 1993)—which holds under the lottery CSF, and contrasts prior work in contests. Finally, new insight into uniqueness of equilibrium for network contest games is provided. Our framework has a broad range of applications, including research and development, advertising, and research funding.

AB - We develop a model of contests on networks. Each player is connected to a set of contests and exerts a single effort to increase the probability of winning each contest to which she is connected. We explore how behavior is shaped by the pattern of interactions and characterize the networks that tend to induce greater effort; in particular, we show that the complete bipartite network is the unique structure that maximizes aggregate player effort. We also obtain a new exclusion result—akin to the Exclusion Principle of Baye et al. (Am Econ Rev 83(1):289-294, 1993)—which holds under the lottery CSF, and contrasts prior work in contests. Finally, new insight into uniqueness of equilibrium for network contest games is provided. Our framework has a broad range of applications, including research and development, advertising, and research funding.

KW - Bipartite graph

KW - C72

KW - Contests

KW - D70

KW - D85

KW - Exclusion principle

KW - Network games

KW - Tullock contest

U2 - 10.1007/s00199-024-01562-z

DO - 10.1007/s00199-024-01562-z

M3 - Journal article

VL - 78

SP - 815

EP - 841

JO - Economic Theory

JF - Economic Theory

SN - 0938-2259

IS - 3

ER -