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Efficient Public Good Provision Between and Within Groups

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Published
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>31/03/2025
<mark>Journal</mark>Games and Economic Behavior
Volume150
Number of pages8
Pages (from-to)183-190
Publication StatusPublished
Early online date13/12/24
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

We generalize the model of Gallice and Monzón (2019) to incorporate a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium.