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Efficient Public Good Provision Between and Within Groups

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Efficient Public Good Provision Between and Within Groups. / Anwar, Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib; Bruno, Jorge; Foucart, Renaud et al.
In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 150, 31.03.2025, p. 183-190.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Anwar, CMS, Bruno, J, Foucart, R & Sen Gupta, S 2025, 'Efficient Public Good Provision Between and Within Groups', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 150, pp. 183-190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.006

APA

Anwar, C. M. S., Bruno, J., Foucart, R., & Sen Gupta, S. (2025). Efficient Public Good Provision Between and Within Groups. Games and Economic Behavior, 150, 183-190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.006

Vancouver

Anwar CMS, Bruno J, Foucart R, Sen Gupta S. Efficient Public Good Provision Between and Within Groups. Games and Economic Behavior. 2025 Mar 31;150:183-190. Epub 2024 Dec 13. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.006

Author

Anwar, Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib ; Bruno, Jorge ; Foucart, Renaud et al. / Efficient Public Good Provision Between and Within Groups. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2025 ; Vol. 150. pp. 183-190.

Bibtex

@article{66ee7674b9754e03b213f2984cd23f74,
title = "Efficient Public Good Provision Between and Within Groups",
abstract = "We generalize the model of Gallice and Monz{\'o}n (2019) to incorporate a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium.",
author = "Anwar, {Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib} and Jorge Bruno and Renaud Foucart and {Sen Gupta}, Sonali",
year = "2025",
month = mar,
day = "31",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.006",
language = "English",
volume = "150",
pages = "183--190",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "ELSEVIER ACADEMIC PRESS INC",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Efficient Public Good Provision Between and Within Groups

AU - Anwar, Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib

AU - Bruno, Jorge

AU - Foucart, Renaud

AU - Sen Gupta, Sonali

PY - 2025/3/31

Y1 - 2025/3/31

N2 - We generalize the model of Gallice and Monzón (2019) to incorporate a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium.

AB - We generalize the model of Gallice and Monzón (2019) to incorporate a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium.

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.006

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.006

M3 - Journal article

VL - 150

SP - 183

EP - 190

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -