Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Experimental study of repeated team-games
View graph of relations

Experimental study of repeated team-games

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Published
Close
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>12/1996
<mark>Journal</mark>European Journal of Political Economy
Issue number4
Volume12
Number of pages11
Pages (from-to)629-639
Publication StatusPublished
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

We report an experiment in which the Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game was contrasted with a structurally identical (single-group) Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). The games were played repeatedly for 40 rounds. We found that subjects were initially more likely to cooperate in the IPD game than in the PD game. However, cooperation rates decreased as the game progressed and, as a result, the differences between the two games disappeared. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that subjects learn the structure of the game and adapt their behavior accordingly. Computer simulations based on a simple learning model by Roth and Erev (Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term, Games and Economic Behavior 8, 164-212, 1995) support this interpretation.