Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Experimental study of repeated team-games
AU - Bornstein, G.
AU - Winter, E.
AU - Goren, H.
PY - 1996/12
Y1 - 1996/12
N2 - We report an experiment in which the Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game was contrasted with a structurally identical (single-group) Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). The games were played repeatedly for 40 rounds. We found that subjects were initially more likely to cooperate in the IPD game than in the PD game. However, cooperation rates decreased as the game progressed and, as a result, the differences between the two games disappeared. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that subjects learn the structure of the game and adapt their behavior accordingly. Computer simulations based on a simple learning model by Roth and Erev (Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term, Games and Economic Behavior 8, 164-212, 1995) support this interpretation.
AB - We report an experiment in which the Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game was contrasted with a structurally identical (single-group) Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). The games were played repeatedly for 40 rounds. We found that subjects were initially more likely to cooperate in the IPD game than in the PD game. However, cooperation rates decreased as the game progressed and, as a result, the differences between the two games disappeared. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that subjects learn the structure of the game and adapt their behavior accordingly. Computer simulations based on a simple learning model by Roth and Erev (Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term, Games and Economic Behavior 8, 164-212, 1995) support this interpretation.
KW - Intergroup conflict
KW - Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma game
KW - Repeated team-games
U2 - 10.1016/S0176-2680(96)00020-1
DO - 10.1016/S0176-2680(96)00020-1
M3 - Journal article
VL - 12
SP - 629
EP - 639
JO - European Journal of Political Economy
JF - European Journal of Political Economy
SN - 0176-2680
IS - 4
ER -