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Financial wealth, socioemotional wealth and IPO underpricing in family firms: a two-stage gamble model

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Financial wealth, socioemotional wealth and IPO underpricing in family firms: a two-stage gamble model. / Kotlar, Josip; Signori, Andrea; De Massis, Alfredo et al.
In: Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 61, No. 3, 01.06.2018, p. 1073-1099.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

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Kotlar J, Signori A, De Massis A, Vismara S. Financial wealth, socioemotional wealth and IPO underpricing in family firms: a two-stage gamble model. Academy of Management Journal. 2018 Jun 1;61(3):1073-1099. Epub 2017 Jun 26. doi: 10.5465/amj.2016.0256

Author

Kotlar, Josip ; Signori, Andrea ; De Massis, Alfredo et al. / Financial wealth, socioemotional wealth and IPO underpricing in family firms : a two-stage gamble model. In: Academy of Management Journal. 2018 ; Vol. 61, No. 3. pp. 1073-1099.

Bibtex

@article{aae73c346c0f4fbd87ab798f484434d1,
title = "Financial wealth, socioemotional wealth and IPO underpricing in family firms: a two-stage gamble model",
abstract = "There are competing theoretical explanations and conflicting empirical evidence for the initial public offering (IPO) underpricing phenomenon in family firms. The behavioral agency model predicts that loss-averse family firms discount their shares more than nonfamily firms to minimize losses of socioemotional wealth (SEW). Conversely, the endowment effect in prospect theory suggests that family owners maximize their financial wealth (FW) by including SEW in perceptions of firm value and demanding a higher IPO price to relinquish it. We reconcile these seemingly incompatible predictions by examining dynamic properties of the reference point in decision framing. Conceiving IPO pricing as a two-stage gamble, we theorize that initial SEW losses entailed by the listing decision increase the disposition of family owners to underprice IPO shares to possibly offset these losses, or {"}break even.{"} We thereby advance the behavioral agency model with the aversion to loss realization logic to explain how family owners' decision frames and preferences change during the IPO process, depending on initial losses of current SEW and new expectations of future SEW. Our analysis of 1,807 IPOs in Europe supports our theoretical expectations, clarifying the trade-off between FW and SEW and explicating the dynamic properties of mixed gambles in family firms.",
author = "Josip Kotlar and Andrea Signori and {De Massis}, Alfredo and Silvio Vismara",
note = "Copyright {\textcopyright} 2017 Academy of Management. All rights reserved.",
year = "2018",
month = jun,
day = "1",
doi = "10.5465/amj.2016.0256",
language = "English",
volume = "61",
pages = "1073--1099",
journal = "Academy of Management Journal",
issn = "0001-4273",
publisher = "Academy of Management",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Financial wealth, socioemotional wealth and IPO underpricing in family firms

T2 - a two-stage gamble model

AU - Kotlar, Josip

AU - Signori, Andrea

AU - De Massis, Alfredo

AU - Vismara, Silvio

N1 - Copyright © 2017 Academy of Management. All rights reserved.

PY - 2018/6/1

Y1 - 2018/6/1

N2 - There are competing theoretical explanations and conflicting empirical evidence for the initial public offering (IPO) underpricing phenomenon in family firms. The behavioral agency model predicts that loss-averse family firms discount their shares more than nonfamily firms to minimize losses of socioemotional wealth (SEW). Conversely, the endowment effect in prospect theory suggests that family owners maximize their financial wealth (FW) by including SEW in perceptions of firm value and demanding a higher IPO price to relinquish it. We reconcile these seemingly incompatible predictions by examining dynamic properties of the reference point in decision framing. Conceiving IPO pricing as a two-stage gamble, we theorize that initial SEW losses entailed by the listing decision increase the disposition of family owners to underprice IPO shares to possibly offset these losses, or "break even." We thereby advance the behavioral agency model with the aversion to loss realization logic to explain how family owners' decision frames and preferences change during the IPO process, depending on initial losses of current SEW and new expectations of future SEW. Our analysis of 1,807 IPOs in Europe supports our theoretical expectations, clarifying the trade-off between FW and SEW and explicating the dynamic properties of mixed gambles in family firms.

AB - There are competing theoretical explanations and conflicting empirical evidence for the initial public offering (IPO) underpricing phenomenon in family firms. The behavioral agency model predicts that loss-averse family firms discount their shares more than nonfamily firms to minimize losses of socioemotional wealth (SEW). Conversely, the endowment effect in prospect theory suggests that family owners maximize their financial wealth (FW) by including SEW in perceptions of firm value and demanding a higher IPO price to relinquish it. We reconcile these seemingly incompatible predictions by examining dynamic properties of the reference point in decision framing. Conceiving IPO pricing as a two-stage gamble, we theorize that initial SEW losses entailed by the listing decision increase the disposition of family owners to underprice IPO shares to possibly offset these losses, or "break even." We thereby advance the behavioral agency model with the aversion to loss realization logic to explain how family owners' decision frames and preferences change during the IPO process, depending on initial losses of current SEW and new expectations of future SEW. Our analysis of 1,807 IPOs in Europe supports our theoretical expectations, clarifying the trade-off between FW and SEW and explicating the dynamic properties of mixed gambles in family firms.

U2 - 10.5465/amj.2016.0256

DO - 10.5465/amj.2016.0256

M3 - Journal article

VL - 61

SP - 1073

EP - 1099

JO - Academy of Management Journal

JF - Academy of Management Journal

SN - 0001-4273

IS - 3

ER -