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Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Imaginability, morality, and fictional truth : dissolving the puzzle of ‘imaginative resistance’.
AU - Todd, Cain Samuel
N1 - The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
PY - 2009/3
Y1 - 2009/3
N2 - This paper argues that there is no genuine puzzle of �imaginative resistance�. In part I of the paper I argue that the imaginability of fictional propositions is relative to a range of different factors including the �thickness� of certain concepts, and certain pre-theoretical and theoretical commitments. I suggest that those holding realist moral commitments may be more susceptible to resistance and inability than those holding non-realist commitments, and that it is such realist commitments that ultimately motivate the problem. However, I argue that the relativity of imaginability is not a particularly puzzling feature of imagination. In part II, I claim that it is the so-called �alethic� puzzle, concerning fictional truth, which generates a real puzzle about imaginative resistance. However, I argue that the alethic puzzle itself depends on certain realist assumptions about the nature of fictional truth which are implausible and should be rejected in favour of an interpretative view of fictional truth. Once this is done, I contend, it becomes evident that the supposed problem of imaginative resistance as it has hitherto been discussed in the literature is not puzzling at all.
AB - This paper argues that there is no genuine puzzle of �imaginative resistance�. In part I of the paper I argue that the imaginability of fictional propositions is relative to a range of different factors including the �thickness� of certain concepts, and certain pre-theoretical and theoretical commitments. I suggest that those holding realist moral commitments may be more susceptible to resistance and inability than those holding non-realist commitments, and that it is such realist commitments that ultimately motivate the problem. However, I argue that the relativity of imaginability is not a particularly puzzling feature of imagination. In part II, I claim that it is the so-called �alethic� puzzle, concerning fictional truth, which generates a real puzzle about imaginative resistance. However, I argue that the alethic puzzle itself depends on certain realist assumptions about the nature of fictional truth which are implausible and should be rejected in favour of an interpretative view of fictional truth. Once this is done, I contend, it becomes evident that the supposed problem of imaginative resistance as it has hitherto been discussed in the literature is not puzzling at all.
KW - aesthetics
KW - fiction
KW - fictional truth
KW - moral judgement
KW - imagination
KW - imaginability
U2 - 10.1007/s11098-007-9198-5
DO - 10.1007/s11098-007-9198-5
M3 - Journal article
VL - 143
SP - 187
EP - 211
JO - Philosophical Studies
JF - Philosophical Studies
SN - 0031-8116
IS - 2
ER -