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Incorporated in Westminster: Channels and Returns to Political Connection in the United Kingdom

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Incorporated in Westminster: Channels and Returns to Political Connection in the United Kingdom. / Green, Colin; Homroy, Swarnodeep.
In: Economica, Vol. 89, No. 354, 30.04.2022, p. 377-408.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Green, C & Homroy, S 2022, 'Incorporated in Westminster: Channels and Returns to Political Connection in the United Kingdom', Economica, vol. 89, no. 354, pp. 377-408. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12402

APA

Green, C., & Homroy, S. (2022). Incorporated in Westminster: Channels and Returns to Political Connection in the United Kingdom. Economica, 89(354), 377-408. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12402

Vancouver

Green C, Homroy S. Incorporated in Westminster: Channels and Returns to Political Connection in the United Kingdom. Economica. 2022 Apr 30;89(354):377-408. Epub 2021 Nov 17. doi: 10.1111/ecca.12402

Author

Green, Colin ; Homroy, Swarnodeep. / Incorporated in Westminster : Channels and Returns to Political Connection in the United Kingdom. In: Economica. 2022 ; Vol. 89, No. 354. pp. 377-408.

Bibtex

@article{6348030e376840fa9afd3540566a0b02,
title = "Incorporated in Westminster: Channels and Returns to Political Connection in the United Kingdom",
abstract = "We present a simple agency model with a revenue-maximizing government and many public officials (agents) in charge of collecting payments from citizens. Agents are of two types, honest and potentially dishonest, with the latter having an inherent propensity to demand bribes from citizens. This propensity may eventually turn into actual (perceived) corruption depending on the strategy pursued by the government. In equilibrium, we derive a non-linear relationship between potential and perceived corruption and, specifically, three distinct policy regimes in which the opportunistic behaviour is curbed, eradicated or tolerated. Different regimes are characterized by different bureaucracy sizes, and we conjecture that low levels of perceived corruption may, in some circumstances, be due to a dilution effect of bribery cases on large numbers of public employees. Some simple descriptive evidence on European regions appears to confirm our theoretical insights.",
author = "Colin Green and Swarnodeep Homroy",
year = "2022",
month = apr,
day = "30",
doi = "10.1111/ecca.12402",
language = "English",
volume = "89",
pages = "377--408",
journal = "Economica",
issn = "0013-0427",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "354",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Incorporated in Westminster

T2 - Channels and Returns to Political Connection in the United Kingdom

AU - Green, Colin

AU - Homroy, Swarnodeep

PY - 2022/4/30

Y1 - 2022/4/30

N2 - We present a simple agency model with a revenue-maximizing government and many public officials (agents) in charge of collecting payments from citizens. Agents are of two types, honest and potentially dishonest, with the latter having an inherent propensity to demand bribes from citizens. This propensity may eventually turn into actual (perceived) corruption depending on the strategy pursued by the government. In equilibrium, we derive a non-linear relationship between potential and perceived corruption and, specifically, three distinct policy regimes in which the opportunistic behaviour is curbed, eradicated or tolerated. Different regimes are characterized by different bureaucracy sizes, and we conjecture that low levels of perceived corruption may, in some circumstances, be due to a dilution effect of bribery cases on large numbers of public employees. Some simple descriptive evidence on European regions appears to confirm our theoretical insights.

AB - We present a simple agency model with a revenue-maximizing government and many public officials (agents) in charge of collecting payments from citizens. Agents are of two types, honest and potentially dishonest, with the latter having an inherent propensity to demand bribes from citizens. This propensity may eventually turn into actual (perceived) corruption depending on the strategy pursued by the government. In equilibrium, we derive a non-linear relationship between potential and perceived corruption and, specifically, three distinct policy regimes in which the opportunistic behaviour is curbed, eradicated or tolerated. Different regimes are characterized by different bureaucracy sizes, and we conjecture that low levels of perceived corruption may, in some circumstances, be due to a dilution effect of bribery cases on large numbers of public employees. Some simple descriptive evidence on European regions appears to confirm our theoretical insights.

U2 - 10.1111/ecca.12402

DO - 10.1111/ecca.12402

M3 - Journal article

VL - 89

SP - 377

EP - 408

JO - Economica

JF - Economica

SN - 0013-0427

IS - 354

ER -