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Information disclosure to employees and rational expectations: a game theoretical perspective - a comment

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

<mark>Journal publication date</mark>10/1997
<mark>Journal</mark>Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
Issue number9
Number of pages3
Pages (from-to)1433-1435
Publication StatusPublished
<mark>Original language</mark>English


In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non-disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real-world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate.