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Information disclosure to employees and rational expectations: a game theoretical perspective - a comment

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Information disclosure to employees and rational expectations: a game theoretical perspective - a comment. / Pope, P F; Peel, David.

In: Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 24, No. 9, 10.1997, p. 1433-1435.

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Pope, P F ; Peel, David. / Information disclosure to employees and rational expectations: a game theoretical perspective - a comment. In: Journal of Business Finance and Accounting. 1997 ; Vol. 24, No. 9. pp. 1433-1435.

Bibtex

@article{4633fd4ace4345258be870226465dbb9,
title = "Information disclosure to employees and rational expectations: a game theoretical perspective - a comment",
abstract = "In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non-disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real-world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate.",
keywords = "wage bargainin, employee disclosure",
author = "Pope, {P F} and David Peel",
year = "1997",
month = oct,
doi = "10.1111/1468-5957.t01-1-00172",
language = "English",
volume = "24",
pages = "1433--1435",
journal = "Journal of Business Finance and Accounting",
issn = "0306-686X",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "9",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Information disclosure to employees and rational expectations: a game theoretical perspective - a comment

AU - Pope, P F

AU - Peel, David

PY - 1997/10

Y1 - 1997/10

N2 - In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non-disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real-world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate.

AB - In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non-disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real-world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate.

KW - wage bargainin

KW - employee disclosure

U2 - 10.1111/1468-5957.t01-1-00172

DO - 10.1111/1468-5957.t01-1-00172

M3 - Journal article

VL - 24

SP - 1433

EP - 1435

JO - Journal of Business Finance and Accounting

JF - Journal of Business Finance and Accounting

SN - 0306-686X

IS - 9

ER -