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Intellectual Property Regimes and Firm Structure

Research output: Working paper

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Intellectual Property Regimes and Firm Structure. / Bhattacharya, Sourav; Chakraborty, Pavel; Chatterjee, Chirantan.
Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2018. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Bhattacharya, S, Chakraborty, P & Chatterjee, C 2018 'Intellectual Property Regimes and Firm Structure' Economics Working Papers Series, Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster.

APA

Bhattacharya, S., Chakraborty, P., & Chatterjee, C. (2018). Intellectual Property Regimes and Firm Structure. (Economics Working Papers Series). Lancaster University, Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Bhattacharya S, Chakraborty P, Chatterjee C. Intellectual Property Regimes and Firm Structure. Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics. 2018 Jun. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Author

Bhattacharya, Sourav ; Chakraborty, Pavel ; Chatterjee, Chirantan. / Intellectual Property Regimes and Firm Structure. Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2018. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Bibtex

@techreport{b6437e2b96bd480c91f76c9bada3145e,
title = "Intellectual Property Regimes and Firm Structure",
abstract = "We use The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 in India as a quasi-natural experiment to identify the causal e¤ect of higher incentives for innovation on firm organizational features. We find that stronger intellectual property (IP) protection has a sharper impact on technologically advanced firms, i.e., firms that were a-priori above the industry median in terms of technology adoption. While there is an overall increase in managers' share of compensation, this increase is about 1.6-1.7% more for high-tech firms. This difference can be attributed to a larger increase in performance pay for high-tech firms. The reform also leads to a significant increase in number of managerial layers and number of divisions for high-tech firms relative to low-tech firms, but only the latter effect is correlated with the differential change in managerial compensation. Broadly, we demonstrate that stronger IP protection leads to an increase in both within-firm and between-firm wage inequality, with more robust evidence for between-firm inequality.",
keywords = "Intellectual Property Regimes, High-tech and Low-tech firms, Managerial Com- pensation, Span of Control",
author = "Sourav Bhattacharya and Pavel Chakraborty and Chirantan Chatterjee",
year = "2018",
month = jun,
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Papers Series",
publisher = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Intellectual Property Regimes and Firm Structure

AU - Bhattacharya, Sourav

AU - Chakraborty, Pavel

AU - Chatterjee, Chirantan

PY - 2018/6

Y1 - 2018/6

N2 - We use The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 in India as a quasi-natural experiment to identify the causal e¤ect of higher incentives for innovation on firm organizational features. We find that stronger intellectual property (IP) protection has a sharper impact on technologically advanced firms, i.e., firms that were a-priori above the industry median in terms of technology adoption. While there is an overall increase in managers' share of compensation, this increase is about 1.6-1.7% more for high-tech firms. This difference can be attributed to a larger increase in performance pay for high-tech firms. The reform also leads to a significant increase in number of managerial layers and number of divisions for high-tech firms relative to low-tech firms, but only the latter effect is correlated with the differential change in managerial compensation. Broadly, we demonstrate that stronger IP protection leads to an increase in both within-firm and between-firm wage inequality, with more robust evidence for between-firm inequality.

AB - We use The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 in India as a quasi-natural experiment to identify the causal e¤ect of higher incentives for innovation on firm organizational features. We find that stronger intellectual property (IP) protection has a sharper impact on technologically advanced firms, i.e., firms that were a-priori above the industry median in terms of technology adoption. While there is an overall increase in managers' share of compensation, this increase is about 1.6-1.7% more for high-tech firms. This difference can be attributed to a larger increase in performance pay for high-tech firms. The reform also leads to a significant increase in number of managerial layers and number of divisions for high-tech firms relative to low-tech firms, but only the latter effect is correlated with the differential change in managerial compensation. Broadly, we demonstrate that stronger IP protection leads to an increase in both within-firm and between-firm wage inequality, with more robust evidence for between-firm inequality.

KW - Intellectual Property Regimes

KW - High-tech and Low-tech firms

KW - Managerial Com- pensation

KW - Span of Control

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Papers Series

BT - Intellectual Property Regimes and Firm Structure

PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster

ER -