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  • IJCIP_Historical_Attacks

    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 35, 2021 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijcip.2021.100464

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    Available under license: CC BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License

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Looking back to look forward: Lessons learnt from cyber-attacks on Industrial Control Systems

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Published
Article number100464
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>31/12/2021
<mark>Journal</mark>International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection
Volume35
Publication StatusPublished
Early online date15/07/21
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

Since the 1980s, we have observed a range of cyberattacks targeting Industrial Control Systems (ICS), some of which have impacted elements of critical national infrastructure (CNI). While there are access limitations on information surrounding ICS focused cyberattacks, particularly within a CNI context, this paper provides an extensive summary of those publicly reported. By identifying and analysing previous ICS focused cyberattacks, we document their evolution, affording cyber-security practitioners with a greater understanding of attack vectors, threat actors, impact, and targeted sectors and locations, critical to the continued development of holistic risk management strategies.

Bibliographic note

This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 35, 2021 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijcip.2021.100464

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