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    Rights statement: The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, The Cambridge Law Journal, 78 (2), pp355-382 2019, © 2019 Cambridge University Press

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Malice as an Ingredient of Tort Liability

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Malice as an Ingredient of Tort Liability. / Murphy, John Roger.
In: The Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 78, No. 2, 01.07.2019, p. 355-382.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Murphy, JR 2019, 'Malice as an Ingredient of Tort Liability', The Cambridge Law Journal, vol. 78, no. 2, pp. 355-382. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197319000412

APA

Vancouver

Murphy JR. Malice as an Ingredient of Tort Liability. The Cambridge Law Journal. 2019 Jul 1;78(2):355-382. Epub 2019 May 10. doi: 10.1017/S0008197319000412

Author

Murphy, John Roger. / Malice as an Ingredient of Tort Liability. In: The Cambridge Law Journal. 2019 ; Vol. 78, No. 2. pp. 355-382.

Bibtex

@article{cc5c0a34ca444cf6b339ad679119eb9c,
title = "Malice as an Ingredient of Tort Liability",
abstract = "This article is concerned with the question of whether malice is an appropriate touchstone of liability in tort law. It begins by identifying four torts in which malice may properly be regarded as an ingredient of liability (distinguishing various other torts, such as private nuisance and defamation, in which malice plays a merely secondary and contingent role). Having identified these four torts – namely malicious prosecution, abuse of process, misfeasance in a public office and lawful means conspiracy – the article then seeks to identify a common juridical thread which links them together. So doing serves to rebut the allegation, often made in respect of all them, namely, that they are anomalous actions. It then concludes by considering the individual worth of these torts, bearing in mind the important difference between not being anomalous on the one hand, and being positively meritorious on the other. It concludes that a respectable defence of each of the four torts can be made even though malice is an atypical touchstone of liability.",
author = "Murphy, {John Roger}",
note = "The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, The Cambridge Law Journal, 78 (2), pp355-382 2019, {\textcopyright} 2019 Cambridge University Press",
year = "2019",
month = jul,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1017/S0008197319000412",
language = "English",
volume = "78",
pages = "355--382",
journal = "The Cambridge Law Journal",
issn = "0008-1973",
publisher = "Stevens & Sons",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Malice as an Ingredient of Tort Liability

AU - Murphy, John Roger

N1 - The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, The Cambridge Law Journal, 78 (2), pp355-382 2019, © 2019 Cambridge University Press

PY - 2019/7/1

Y1 - 2019/7/1

N2 - This article is concerned with the question of whether malice is an appropriate touchstone of liability in tort law. It begins by identifying four torts in which malice may properly be regarded as an ingredient of liability (distinguishing various other torts, such as private nuisance and defamation, in which malice plays a merely secondary and contingent role). Having identified these four torts – namely malicious prosecution, abuse of process, misfeasance in a public office and lawful means conspiracy – the article then seeks to identify a common juridical thread which links them together. So doing serves to rebut the allegation, often made in respect of all them, namely, that they are anomalous actions. It then concludes by considering the individual worth of these torts, bearing in mind the important difference between not being anomalous on the one hand, and being positively meritorious on the other. It concludes that a respectable defence of each of the four torts can be made even though malice is an atypical touchstone of liability.

AB - This article is concerned with the question of whether malice is an appropriate touchstone of liability in tort law. It begins by identifying four torts in which malice may properly be regarded as an ingredient of liability (distinguishing various other torts, such as private nuisance and defamation, in which malice plays a merely secondary and contingent role). Having identified these four torts – namely malicious prosecution, abuse of process, misfeasance in a public office and lawful means conspiracy – the article then seeks to identify a common juridical thread which links them together. So doing serves to rebut the allegation, often made in respect of all them, namely, that they are anomalous actions. It then concludes by considering the individual worth of these torts, bearing in mind the important difference between not being anomalous on the one hand, and being positively meritorious on the other. It concludes that a respectable defence of each of the four torts can be made even though malice is an atypical touchstone of liability.

U2 - 10.1017/S0008197319000412

DO - 10.1017/S0008197319000412

M3 - Journal article

VL - 78

SP - 355

EP - 382

JO - The Cambridge Law Journal

JF - The Cambridge Law Journal

SN - 0008-1973

IS - 2

ER -