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Market Design for the Environment

Research output: Working paper

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Market Design for the Environment. / Cantillon, Estelle; Slechten, Aurelie.
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2023.

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Cantillon, E & Slechten, A 2023 'Market Design for the Environment' National Bureau of Economic Research. <https://www.nber.org/papers/w31987>

APA

Cantillon, E., & Slechten, A. (2023). Market Design for the Environment. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://www.nber.org/papers/w31987

Vancouver

Cantillon E, Slechten A. Market Design for the Environment. National Bureau of Economic Research. 2023 Dec 31.

Author

Cantillon, Estelle ; Slechten, Aurelie. / Market Design for the Environment. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2023.

Bibtex

@techreport{e8da0cebb12f4da3a85d245c60f958d9,
title = "Market Design for the Environment",
abstract = "The main argument in favor of markets in environmental contexts is the same as in other contexts: their ability to promote efficient allocations and production. But environmental problems bring their own challenges: their underlying bio-physical processes - and the technologies to monitor them - constrain what is feasible or even desirable. This chapter illustrates the main design dimensions in environmental markets, the trade-offs involved and their impact on performance, through the lens of a regulated market for pollution rights (the EU emissions trading scheme) and a voluntary market for the provision of environmental services (the global market for carbon credits). While both markets eventually contribute to climate change mitigation, their organisation as a {"}pollution market'', for the former, and as a {"}provision market'', for second, means that different design considerations take precedence. Both markets also face challenges: volatile prices in the EU emissions trading scheme and low trust for voluntary carbon markets. We discuss how alternative design options could address those.",
author = "Estelle Cantillon and Aurelie Slechten",
year = "2023",
month = dec,
day = "31",
language = "English",
publisher = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Market Design for the Environment

AU - Cantillon, Estelle

AU - Slechten, Aurelie

PY - 2023/12/31

Y1 - 2023/12/31

N2 - The main argument in favor of markets in environmental contexts is the same as in other contexts: their ability to promote efficient allocations and production. But environmental problems bring their own challenges: their underlying bio-physical processes - and the technologies to monitor them - constrain what is feasible or even desirable. This chapter illustrates the main design dimensions in environmental markets, the trade-offs involved and their impact on performance, through the lens of a regulated market for pollution rights (the EU emissions trading scheme) and a voluntary market for the provision of environmental services (the global market for carbon credits). While both markets eventually contribute to climate change mitigation, their organisation as a "pollution market'', for the former, and as a "provision market'', for second, means that different design considerations take precedence. Both markets also face challenges: volatile prices in the EU emissions trading scheme and low trust for voluntary carbon markets. We discuss how alternative design options could address those.

AB - The main argument in favor of markets in environmental contexts is the same as in other contexts: their ability to promote efficient allocations and production. But environmental problems bring their own challenges: their underlying bio-physical processes - and the technologies to monitor them - constrain what is feasible or even desirable. This chapter illustrates the main design dimensions in environmental markets, the trade-offs involved and their impact on performance, through the lens of a regulated market for pollution rights (the EU emissions trading scheme) and a voluntary market for the provision of environmental services (the global market for carbon credits). While both markets eventually contribute to climate change mitigation, their organisation as a "pollution market'', for the former, and as a "provision market'', for second, means that different design considerations take precedence. Both markets also face challenges: volatile prices in the EU emissions trading scheme and low trust for voluntary carbon markets. We discuss how alternative design options could address those.

M3 - Working paper

BT - Market Design for the Environment

PB - National Bureau of Economic Research

ER -