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Misattributions models (I): metacognitive beliefs and hallucinations

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Misattributions models (I): metacognitive beliefs and hallucinations. / Varese, Filippo; Larøi, Frank.
The neuroscience of hallucinations . ed. / Renaud Jardri; Arnaud Cachia; Pierre Thomas; Delphine Pins. London: Springer, 2013. p. 153-168.

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNChapter (peer-reviewed)peer-review

Harvard

Varese, F & Larøi, F 2013, Misattributions models (I): metacognitive beliefs and hallucinations. in R Jardri, A Cachia, P Thomas & D Pins (eds), The neuroscience of hallucinations . Springer, London, pp. 153-168. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-4121-2_9

APA

Varese, F., & Larøi, F. (2013). Misattributions models (I): metacognitive beliefs and hallucinations. In R. Jardri, A. Cachia, P. Thomas, & D. Pins (Eds.), The neuroscience of hallucinations (pp. 153-168). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-4121-2_9

Vancouver

Varese F, Larøi F. Misattributions models (I): metacognitive beliefs and hallucinations. In Jardri R, Cachia A, Thomas P, Pins D, editors, The neuroscience of hallucinations . London: Springer. 2013. p. 153-168 doi: 10.1007/978-1-4614-4121-2_9

Author

Varese, Filippo ; Larøi, Frank. / Misattributions models (I) : metacognitive beliefs and hallucinations. The neuroscience of hallucinations . editor / Renaud Jardri ; Arnaud Cachia ; Pierre Thomas ; Delphine Pins. London : Springer, 2013. pp. 153-168

Bibtex

@inbook{623ddab3ee744785974d6b559462a124,
title = "Misattributions models (I): metacognitive beliefs and hallucinations",
abstract = "Morrison et al. (Behav Cogn Psychother 23(3):265–280, 1995) have ­proposed a cognitive model which assumes that hallucinatory experiences arise from the externalisation of intrusive thoughts. According to this account, this externalising process is driven by the cognitive dissonance resulting from the experience of uncontrollable intrusive mental events and maladaptive metacognitive beliefs about the importance of thought consistency and the need to control thoughts. Over the past 15 years, a number of empirical studies have examined the presumed association between hallucinations and metacognitive beliefs in the attempt to test the empirical predictions of this cognitive model. This chapter provides an up-to-date critical review of the studies in this area. Despite some positive findings (mostly from non-clinical studies), the available evidence suggests that the association between metacognitive beliefs and hallucinations is not a particularly robust, and may be confounded by comorbid symptom dimensions that frequently covary with hallucination-proneness in clinical and non-clinical samples. Conversely, recent studies have indicated that metacognitive beliefs, although not directly implicated in the genesis of hallucinatory experiences, may represent an important determinant of hallucination-related distress, therefore representing a potential target for intervention. These results are discussed in relation to their potential clinical significance and future research into the role played by metacognitive beliefs in different symptoms of psychopathology.",
keywords = "Hallucinations, psychosis, metacognitive beliefs",
author = "Filippo Varese and Frank Lar{\o}i",
year = "2013",
doi = "10.1007/978-1-4614-4121-2_9",
language = "English",
isbn = "9781461441205",
pages = "153--168",
editor = "Renaud Jardri and Arnaud Cachia and Pierre Thomas and Delphine Pins",
booktitle = "The neuroscience of hallucinations",
publisher = "Springer",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Misattributions models (I)

T2 - metacognitive beliefs and hallucinations

AU - Varese, Filippo

AU - Larøi, Frank

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - Morrison et al. (Behav Cogn Psychother 23(3):265–280, 1995) have ­proposed a cognitive model which assumes that hallucinatory experiences arise from the externalisation of intrusive thoughts. According to this account, this externalising process is driven by the cognitive dissonance resulting from the experience of uncontrollable intrusive mental events and maladaptive metacognitive beliefs about the importance of thought consistency and the need to control thoughts. Over the past 15 years, a number of empirical studies have examined the presumed association between hallucinations and metacognitive beliefs in the attempt to test the empirical predictions of this cognitive model. This chapter provides an up-to-date critical review of the studies in this area. Despite some positive findings (mostly from non-clinical studies), the available evidence suggests that the association between metacognitive beliefs and hallucinations is not a particularly robust, and may be confounded by comorbid symptom dimensions that frequently covary with hallucination-proneness in clinical and non-clinical samples. Conversely, recent studies have indicated that metacognitive beliefs, although not directly implicated in the genesis of hallucinatory experiences, may represent an important determinant of hallucination-related distress, therefore representing a potential target for intervention. These results are discussed in relation to their potential clinical significance and future research into the role played by metacognitive beliefs in different symptoms of psychopathology.

AB - Morrison et al. (Behav Cogn Psychother 23(3):265–280, 1995) have ­proposed a cognitive model which assumes that hallucinatory experiences arise from the externalisation of intrusive thoughts. According to this account, this externalising process is driven by the cognitive dissonance resulting from the experience of uncontrollable intrusive mental events and maladaptive metacognitive beliefs about the importance of thought consistency and the need to control thoughts. Over the past 15 years, a number of empirical studies have examined the presumed association between hallucinations and metacognitive beliefs in the attempt to test the empirical predictions of this cognitive model. This chapter provides an up-to-date critical review of the studies in this area. Despite some positive findings (mostly from non-clinical studies), the available evidence suggests that the association between metacognitive beliefs and hallucinations is not a particularly robust, and may be confounded by comorbid symptom dimensions that frequently covary with hallucination-proneness in clinical and non-clinical samples. Conversely, recent studies have indicated that metacognitive beliefs, although not directly implicated in the genesis of hallucinatory experiences, may represent an important determinant of hallucination-related distress, therefore representing a potential target for intervention. These results are discussed in relation to their potential clinical significance and future research into the role played by metacognitive beliefs in different symptoms of psychopathology.

KW - Hallucinations

KW - psychosis

KW - metacognitive beliefs

U2 - 10.1007/978-1-4614-4121-2_9

DO - 10.1007/978-1-4614-4121-2_9

M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)

SN - 9781461441205

SP - 153

EP - 168

BT - The neuroscience of hallucinations

A2 - Jardri, Renaud

A2 - Cachia, Arnaud

A2 - Thomas, Pierre

A2 - Pins, Delphine

PB - Springer

CY - London

ER -