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On bargaining position descriptions in non-transferable utility games - Symmetry versus asymmetry

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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On bargaining position descriptions in non-transferable utility games - Symmetry versus asymmetry. / Winter, E.
In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1992, p. 191-211.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Winter, E 1992, 'On bargaining position descriptions in non-transferable utility games - Symmetry versus asymmetry', International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 191-211. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01245461

APA

Winter, E. (1992). On bargaining position descriptions in non-transferable utility games - Symmetry versus asymmetry. International Journal of Game Theory, 21(2), 191-211. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01245461

Vancouver

Winter E. On bargaining position descriptions in non-transferable utility games - Symmetry versus asymmetry. International Journal of Game Theory. 1992;21(2):191-211. doi: 10.1007/BF01245461

Author

Winter, E. / On bargaining position descriptions in non-transferable utility games - Symmetry versus asymmetry. In: International Journal of Game Theory. 1992 ; Vol. 21, No. 2. pp. 191-211.

Bibtex

@article{a552592d7114496c8b9925c7a15daf03,
title = "On bargaining position descriptions in non-transferable utility games - Symmetry versus asymmetry",
abstract = "We present a generalization to the Harsanyi solution for non-transferable utility (NTU) games based on non-symmetry among the players. Our notion of non-symmetry is presented by a configuration of weights which correspond to players' relative bargaining power in various coalitions. We show not only that our solution (i.e., the bargaining position solution) generalizes the Harsanyi solution, (and thus also the Shapley value), but also that almost all the non-symmetric generalizations of the Shapley value for transferable utility games known in the literature are in fact bargaining position solutions. We also show that the non-symmetric Nash solution for the bargaining problem is also a special case of our general solution. We use our general representation of non-symmetry to make a detailed comparison of all the recent extensions of the Shapley value using both a direct and an axiomatic approach. {\textcopyright} 1992 Physica-Verlag.",
keywords = "General Solution , General Representation , Economic Theory, Game Theory , Detailed Comparison ",
author = "E. Winter",
year = "1992",
doi = "10.1007/BF01245461",
language = "English",
volume = "21",
pages = "191--211",
journal = "International Journal of Game Theory",
issn = "0020-7276",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag,",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - On bargaining position descriptions in non-transferable utility games - Symmetry versus asymmetry

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 1992

Y1 - 1992

N2 - We present a generalization to the Harsanyi solution for non-transferable utility (NTU) games based on non-symmetry among the players. Our notion of non-symmetry is presented by a configuration of weights which correspond to players' relative bargaining power in various coalitions. We show not only that our solution (i.e., the bargaining position solution) generalizes the Harsanyi solution, (and thus also the Shapley value), but also that almost all the non-symmetric generalizations of the Shapley value for transferable utility games known in the literature are in fact bargaining position solutions. We also show that the non-symmetric Nash solution for the bargaining problem is also a special case of our general solution. We use our general representation of non-symmetry to make a detailed comparison of all the recent extensions of the Shapley value using both a direct and an axiomatic approach. © 1992 Physica-Verlag.

AB - We present a generalization to the Harsanyi solution for non-transferable utility (NTU) games based on non-symmetry among the players. Our notion of non-symmetry is presented by a configuration of weights which correspond to players' relative bargaining power in various coalitions. We show not only that our solution (i.e., the bargaining position solution) generalizes the Harsanyi solution, (and thus also the Shapley value), but also that almost all the non-symmetric generalizations of the Shapley value for transferable utility games known in the literature are in fact bargaining position solutions. We also show that the non-symmetric Nash solution for the bargaining problem is also a special case of our general solution. We use our general representation of non-symmetry to make a detailed comparison of all the recent extensions of the Shapley value using both a direct and an axiomatic approach. © 1992 Physica-Verlag.

KW - General Solution

KW - General Representation

KW - Economic Theory

KW - Game Theory

KW - Detailed Comparison

U2 - 10.1007/BF01245461

DO - 10.1007/BF01245461

M3 - Journal article

VL - 21

SP - 191

EP - 211

JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

SN - 0020-7276

IS - 2

ER -