Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Optimal fees in internet auctions

Electronic data


Text available via DOI:

View graph of relations

Optimal fees in internet auctions

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

<mark>Journal publication date</mark>09/2008
<mark>Journal</mark>Review of Economic Design
Issue number3
Number of pages9
Pages (from-to)155-163
Publication StatusPublished
<mark>Original language</mark>English


An auction house runs a second-price auction with a possibility of resale through re-auctions. It collects listing and closing fees from the seller. We find the fees which maximize the revenue of the auction house. In particular, we show that the optimal listing fee is zero. Our findings are consistent with the policies of eBay, Amazon, Yahoo, and other Internet auctions.