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Optimal fees in internet auctions

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Optimal fees in internet auctions. / Matros, Alexander; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy.

In: Review of Economic Design, Vol. 12, No. 3, 09.2008, p. 155-163.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Matros, A & Zapechelnyuk, A 2008, 'Optimal fees in internet auctions', Review of Economic Design, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 155-163. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0044-9

APA

Matros, A., & Zapechelnyuk, A. (2008). Optimal fees in internet auctions. Review of Economic Design, 12(3), 155-163. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0044-9

Vancouver

Matros A, Zapechelnyuk A. Optimal fees in internet auctions. Review of Economic Design. 2008 Sep;12(3):155-163. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0044-9

Author

Matros, Alexander ; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy. / Optimal fees in internet auctions. In: Review of Economic Design. 2008 ; Vol. 12, No. 3. pp. 155-163.

Bibtex

@article{a9ac54efe30847f5930947b0337335cd,
title = "Optimal fees in internet auctions",
abstract = "An auction house runs a second-price auction with a possibility of resale through re-auctions. It collects listing and closing fees from the seller. We find the fees which maximize the revenue of the auction house. In particular, we show that the optimal listing fee is zero. Our findings are consistent with the policies of eBay, Amazon, Yahoo, and other Internet auctions.",
keywords = "Internet auctions, Auctions with resale , Auction house, Listing fee, Closing fee",
author = "Alexander Matros and Andriy Zapechelnyuk",
year = "2008",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1007/s10058-008-0044-9",
language = "English",
volume = "12",
pages = "155--163",
journal = "Review of Economic Design",
issn = "1434-4742",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag,",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Optimal fees in internet auctions

AU - Matros, Alexander

AU - Zapechelnyuk, Andriy

PY - 2008/9

Y1 - 2008/9

N2 - An auction house runs a second-price auction with a possibility of resale through re-auctions. It collects listing and closing fees from the seller. We find the fees which maximize the revenue of the auction house. In particular, we show that the optimal listing fee is zero. Our findings are consistent with the policies of eBay, Amazon, Yahoo, and other Internet auctions.

AB - An auction house runs a second-price auction with a possibility of resale through re-auctions. It collects listing and closing fees from the seller. We find the fees which maximize the revenue of the auction house. In particular, we show that the optimal listing fee is zero. Our findings are consistent with the policies of eBay, Amazon, Yahoo, and other Internet auctions.

KW - Internet auctions

KW - Auctions with resale

KW - Auction house

KW - Listing fee

KW - Closing fee

U2 - 10.1007/s10058-008-0044-9

DO - 10.1007/s10058-008-0044-9

M3 - Journal article

VL - 12

SP - 155

EP - 163

JO - Review of Economic Design

JF - Review of Economic Design

SN - 1434-4742

IS - 3

ER -