Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator
View graph of relations

Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Published
Close
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>07/2011
<mark>Journal</mark>International Journal of Industrial Organization
Issue number4
Volume29
Number of pages6
Pages (from-to)426-431
Publication StatusPublished
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

We consider a multi-period auction with a seller who has a single object for sale, a large population of potential buyers, and a mediator of the trade. The seller and every buyer have independent private values of the object. The mediator designs an auction mechanism which maximizes her revenue subject to certain constraints for the traders. In each period the seller auctions the object to a set of buyers drawn at random from the population. The seller can re-auction the object (infinitely many times) if it is not sold in previous interactions. We characterize the class of mediator-optimal auction mechanisms. One of such mechanisms is a Vickrey auction with a reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator a fixed percentage from the closing price.