Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator

Research

Associated organisational unit

Links

Text available via DOI:

Keywords

View graph of relations

Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Published

Standard

Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator. / Matros, Alexander; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy.
In: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 29, No. 4, 07.2011, p. 426-431.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Matros, A & Zapechelnyuk, A 2011, 'Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator', International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 426-431. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.08.004

APA

Matros, A., & Zapechelnyuk, A. (2011). Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 29(4), 426-431. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.08.004

Vancouver

Matros A, Zapechelnyuk A. Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 2011 Jul;29(4):426-431. doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.08.004

Author

Matros, Alexander ; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy. / Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator. In: International Journal of Industrial Organization. 2011 ; Vol. 29, No. 4. pp. 426-431.

Bibtex

@article{17d8e3096d5244b2a52c164a4dce980d,
title = "Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator",
abstract = "We consider a multi-period auction with a seller who has a single object for sale, a large population of potential buyers, and a mediator of the trade. The seller and every buyer have independent private values of the object. The mediator designs an auction mechanism which maximizes her revenue subject to certain constraints for the traders. In each period the seller auctions the object to a set of buyers drawn at random from the population. The seller can re-auction the object (infinitely many times) if it is not sold in previous interactions. We characterize the class of mediator-optimal auction mechanisms. One of such mechanisms is a Vickrey auction with a reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator a fixed percentage from the closing price.",
keywords = "Optimal mechanism, Vickrey auction, Mediator",
author = "Alexander Matros and Andriy Zapechelnyuk",
year = "2011",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.08.004",
language = "English",
volume = "29",
pages = "426--431",
journal = "International Journal of Industrial Organization",
publisher = "Elsevier Inc.",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator

AU - Matros, Alexander

AU - Zapechelnyuk, Andriy

PY - 2011/7

Y1 - 2011/7

N2 - We consider a multi-period auction with a seller who has a single object for sale, a large population of potential buyers, and a mediator of the trade. The seller and every buyer have independent private values of the object. The mediator designs an auction mechanism which maximizes her revenue subject to certain constraints for the traders. In each period the seller auctions the object to a set of buyers drawn at random from the population. The seller can re-auction the object (infinitely many times) if it is not sold in previous interactions. We characterize the class of mediator-optimal auction mechanisms. One of such mechanisms is a Vickrey auction with a reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator a fixed percentage from the closing price.

AB - We consider a multi-period auction with a seller who has a single object for sale, a large population of potential buyers, and a mediator of the trade. The seller and every buyer have independent private values of the object. The mediator designs an auction mechanism which maximizes her revenue subject to certain constraints for the traders. In each period the seller auctions the object to a set of buyers drawn at random from the population. The seller can re-auction the object (infinitely many times) if it is not sold in previous interactions. We characterize the class of mediator-optimal auction mechanisms. One of such mechanisms is a Vickrey auction with a reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator a fixed percentage from the closing price.

KW - Optimal mechanism

KW - Vickrey auction

KW - Mediator

U2 - 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.08.004

DO - 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.08.004

M3 - Journal article

VL - 29

SP - 426

EP - 431

JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization

JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization

IS - 4

ER -