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Political pressure deflection

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Published
  • James E. Anderson
  • Maurizio Zanardi
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<mark>Journal publication date</mark>2009
<mark>Journal</mark>Public Choice
Issue number1-2
Volume141
Number of pages22
Pages (from-to)129-150
Publication StatusPublished
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes—political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to ‘sell’ is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.