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Political pressure deflection

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Political pressure deflection. / Anderson, James E.; Zanardi, Maurizio.
In: Public Choice, Vol. 141, No. 1-2, 2009, p. 129-150.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Anderson, JE & Zanardi, M 2009, 'Political pressure deflection', Public Choice, vol. 141, no. 1-2, pp. 129-150. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9441-z

APA

Anderson, J. E., & Zanardi, M. (2009). Political pressure deflection. Public Choice, 141(1-2), 129-150. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9441-z

Vancouver

Anderson JE, Zanardi M. Political pressure deflection. Public Choice. 2009;141(1-2):129-150. doi: 10.1007/s11127-009-9441-z

Author

Anderson, James E. ; Zanardi, Maurizio. / Political pressure deflection. In: Public Choice. 2009 ; Vol. 141, No. 1-2. pp. 129-150.

Bibtex

@article{10158514cff345aebe72c889db852cad,
title = "Political pressure deflection",
abstract = "Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes—political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to {\textquoteleft}sell{\textquoteright} is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.",
author = "Anderson, {James E.} and Maurizio Zanardi",
year = "2009",
doi = "10.1007/s11127-009-9441-z",
language = "English",
volume = "141",
pages = "129--150",
journal = "Public Choice",
issn = "0048-5829",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "1-2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Political pressure deflection

AU - Anderson, James E.

AU - Zanardi, Maurizio

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes—political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to ‘sell’ is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.

AB - Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes—political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to ‘sell’ is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.

U2 - 10.1007/s11127-009-9441-z

DO - 10.1007/s11127-009-9441-z

M3 - Journal article

VL - 141

SP - 129

EP - 150

JO - Public Choice

JF - Public Choice

SN - 0048-5829

IS - 1-2

ER -