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Representation and knowledge are not the same thing.

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Representation and knowledge are not the same thing. / Smith, Leslie.

In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 22, No. 5, 10.1999, p. 784-785.

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Smith L. Representation and knowledge are not the same thing. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 1999 Oct;22(5):784-785.

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Smith, Leslie. / Representation and knowledge are not the same thing. In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 1999 ; Vol. 22, No. 5. pp. 784-785.

Bibtex

@article{96849adb4fd3478090d6d51ca877ea54,
title = "Representation and knowledge are not the same thing.",
abstract = "Two standard epistemological accounts are conflated in Dienes & Perner's account of knowledge, and this conflation requires the rejection of their four conditions of knowledge. Because their four metarepresentations applied to the explicit-implicit distinction are paired with these conditions, it follows by modus tollens that if the latter are inadequate, then so are the former. Quite simply, their account misses the link between true reasoning and knowledge.",
author = "Leslie Smith",
note = "http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=BBS The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22 (5), pp 784-785 1999, {\textcopyright} 1999 Cambridge University Press.",
year = "1999",
month = oct,
language = "English",
volume = "22",
pages = "784--785",
journal = "Behavioral and Brain Sciences",
issn = "0140-525X",
publisher = "CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Representation and knowledge are not the same thing.

AU - Smith, Leslie

N1 - http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=BBS The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22 (5), pp 784-785 1999, © 1999 Cambridge University Press.

PY - 1999/10

Y1 - 1999/10

N2 - Two standard epistemological accounts are conflated in Dienes & Perner's account of knowledge, and this conflation requires the rejection of their four conditions of knowledge. Because their four metarepresentations applied to the explicit-implicit distinction are paired with these conditions, it follows by modus tollens that if the latter are inadequate, then so are the former. Quite simply, their account misses the link between true reasoning and knowledge.

AB - Two standard epistemological accounts are conflated in Dienes & Perner's account of knowledge, and this conflation requires the rejection of their four conditions of knowledge. Because their four metarepresentations applied to the explicit-implicit distinction are paired with these conditions, it follows by modus tollens that if the latter are inadequate, then so are the former. Quite simply, their account misses the link between true reasoning and knowledge.

M3 - Journal article

VL - 22

SP - 784

EP - 785

JO - Behavioral and Brain Sciences

JF - Behavioral and Brain Sciences

SN - 0140-525X

IS - 5

ER -