Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Scientists or entrepreneurs
View graph of relations

Scientists or entrepreneurs: rent (mis)appropriation from discoveries made in university labs

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Published

Standard

Scientists or entrepreneurs: rent (mis)appropriation from discoveries made in university labs. / Markman, Gideon D.; Gianodis, Peter T.; Panagopoulos, Andreas P.
In: Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings, Vol. 2007, No. Abstract Supplement, 2007, p. 1-6.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Markman, GD, Gianodis, PT & Panagopoulos, AP 2007, 'Scientists or entrepreneurs: rent (mis)appropriation from discoveries made in university labs', Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings, vol. 2007, no. Abstract Supplement, pp. 1-6. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2007.26530375

APA

Markman, G. D., Gianodis, P. T., & Panagopoulos, A. P. (2007). Scientists or entrepreneurs: rent (mis)appropriation from discoveries made in university labs. Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings, 2007(Abstract Supplement), 1-6. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2007.26530375

Vancouver

Markman GD, Gianodis PT, Panagopoulos AP. Scientists or entrepreneurs: rent (mis)appropriation from discoveries made in university labs. Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings. 2007;2007(Abstract Supplement):1-6. doi: 10.5465/AMBPP.2007.26530375

Author

Markman, Gideon D. ; Gianodis, Peter T. ; Panagopoulos, Andreas P. / Scientists or entrepreneurs : rent (mis)appropriation from discoveries made in university labs. In: Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings. 2007 ; Vol. 2007, No. Abstract Supplement. pp. 1-6.

Bibtex

@article{62574b73b2b7469ebb8fc08b29de5064,
title = "Scientists or entrepreneurs: rent (mis)appropriation from discoveries made in university labs",
abstract = "A random sample of 54 research universities comprised of 23,394 scientists and a mathematical model show how some scientists license their inferior discoveries through their technology licensing offices (TLOs) while privately taking their finest discoveries directly to market. Misappropriation increases with heightened entrepreneurial activities on campuses. Autonomous TLOs and royalty sharing with departments are associated with reduced misappropriation. Agency theory should better account for conditions in which principals have information to sanction agents but instead choose to absorb costs stemming from agents' opportunistic behavior.",
keywords = "LICENSE agreements , TECHNOLOGY , UNIVERSITIES & colleges -- Employees, DISCOVERIES in science, ENTREPRENEURSHIP , SCIENTISTS, ROYALTIES (Copyright) , AGENCY theory",
author = "Markman, {Gideon D.} and Gianodis, {Peter T.} and Panagopoulos, {Andreas P.}",
year = "2007",
doi = "10.5465/AMBPP.2007.26530375",
language = "English",
volume = "2007",
pages = "1--6",
journal = "Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings",
issn = "2151-6561",
publisher = "Academy of Management",
number = "Abstract Supplement",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Scientists or entrepreneurs

T2 - rent (mis)appropriation from discoveries made in university labs

AU - Markman, Gideon D.

AU - Gianodis, Peter T.

AU - Panagopoulos, Andreas P.

PY - 2007

Y1 - 2007

N2 - A random sample of 54 research universities comprised of 23,394 scientists and a mathematical model show how some scientists license their inferior discoveries through their technology licensing offices (TLOs) while privately taking their finest discoveries directly to market. Misappropriation increases with heightened entrepreneurial activities on campuses. Autonomous TLOs and royalty sharing with departments are associated with reduced misappropriation. Agency theory should better account for conditions in which principals have information to sanction agents but instead choose to absorb costs stemming from agents' opportunistic behavior.

AB - A random sample of 54 research universities comprised of 23,394 scientists and a mathematical model show how some scientists license their inferior discoveries through their technology licensing offices (TLOs) while privately taking their finest discoveries directly to market. Misappropriation increases with heightened entrepreneurial activities on campuses. Autonomous TLOs and royalty sharing with departments are associated with reduced misappropriation. Agency theory should better account for conditions in which principals have information to sanction agents but instead choose to absorb costs stemming from agents' opportunistic behavior.

KW - LICENSE agreements

KW - TECHNOLOGY

KW - UNIVERSITIES & colleges -- Employees

KW - DISCOVERIES in science

KW - ENTREPRENEURSHIP

KW - SCIENTISTS

KW - ROYALTIES (Copyright)

KW - AGENCY theory

U2 - 10.5465/AMBPP.2007.26530375

DO - 10.5465/AMBPP.2007.26530375

M3 - Journal article

VL - 2007

SP - 1

EP - 6

JO - Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings

JF - Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings

SN - 2151-6561

IS - Abstract Supplement

ER -