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Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Self-Diagnosis in Psychiatry and the Distribution of Social Resources
AU - Fellowes, Matthew
PY - 2023/9/28
Y1 - 2023/9/28
N2 - I suggest that the diagnosis that an individual self-diagnoses with can be influenced by levels of public awareness. Accurate diagnosis requires consideration of multiple diagnoses. Sometimes, different diagnoses can overlap with one another and can only be differentiated in subtle and nuanced ways, but particular diagnoses vary considerably in levels of public awareness. As such, an individual may meet the diagnostic criteria for one diagnosis but self-diagnoses with a different diagnosis because it is better known. I then outline a potential negative consequence of this. Psychiatric diagnoses can grant access to what I call social resources, namely, political advocacy, campaigning for support, participating in scientific research, building diagnostic cultures, and opportunity for social interactions with people who have the same diagnosis. The strength of the social resources for a particular diagnosis can be made stronger when more people have that diagnosis. As such, inaccurate self-diagnosis can result in the social resources for one diagnosis being strengthened whilst not being strengthened in relation to another diagnosis in comparison to accurate diagnosis. This shows how inaccurate self-diagnosis can alter the distribution of social resources. We need to consider whether this is unfair to people who are diagnosed with less well-known conditions.
AB - I suggest that the diagnosis that an individual self-diagnoses with can be influenced by levels of public awareness. Accurate diagnosis requires consideration of multiple diagnoses. Sometimes, different diagnoses can overlap with one another and can only be differentiated in subtle and nuanced ways, but particular diagnoses vary considerably in levels of public awareness. As such, an individual may meet the diagnostic criteria for one diagnosis but self-diagnoses with a different diagnosis because it is better known. I then outline a potential negative consequence of this. Psychiatric diagnoses can grant access to what I call social resources, namely, political advocacy, campaigning for support, participating in scientific research, building diagnostic cultures, and opportunity for social interactions with people who have the same diagnosis. The strength of the social resources for a particular diagnosis can be made stronger when more people have that diagnosis. As such, inaccurate self-diagnosis can result in the social resources for one diagnosis being strengthened whilst not being strengthened in relation to another diagnosis in comparison to accurate diagnosis. This shows how inaccurate self-diagnosis can alter the distribution of social resources. We need to consider whether this is unfair to people who are diagnosed with less well-known conditions.
U2 - 10.1017/S1358246123000218
DO - 10.1017/S1358246123000218
M3 - Journal article
VL - 94
SP - 55
EP - 76
JO - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
JF - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
SN - 1358-2461
ER -