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Strategic commitment to forgo information: Evidence from the lab

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<mark>Journal publication date</mark>31/03/2025
<mark>Journal</mark>Games and Economic Behavior
Volume150
Number of pages14
Pages (from-to)401-414
Publication StatusPublished
Early online date11/02/25
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

We investigate subjects’ decisions to forgo costless information in interactive situations through laboratory experiments utilizing both within-subject and between-subjects designs. We created three strategic environments, each with two games: one environment with games of common interests, one with games of conflicting interests, and a third with one game of each type. In each environment, participants were paired and presented with the two games. They were then asked individually to choose whether or not to learn (at no cost) which game was being played. This choice was communicated to the other player before the actual game was played. Our results indicate that subjects understand the potential negative value of information in interactive contexts; specifically, they recognize that forgoing information can induce their counterpart to play more cooperatively. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the observed tendency to forgo information aligns with the predictions of rational behavior.