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Strategic commitment to forgo information: Evidence from the lab

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Strategic commitment to forgo information: Evidence from the lab. / Kandel, E.; Mugerman, Y.; Winter, E.
In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 150, 31.03.2025, p. 401-414.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Kandel, E, Mugerman, Y & Winter, E 2025, 'Strategic commitment to forgo information: Evidence from the lab', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 150, pp. 401-414. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.007

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Vancouver

Kandel E, Mugerman Y, Winter E. Strategic commitment to forgo information: Evidence from the lab. Games and Economic Behavior. 2025 Mar 31;150:401-414. Epub 2025 Feb 11. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.007

Author

Kandel, E. ; Mugerman, Y. ; Winter, E. / Strategic commitment to forgo information : Evidence from the lab. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2025 ; Vol. 150. pp. 401-414.

Bibtex

@article{3289bbed619748939aea786eee6a46d2,
title = "Strategic commitment to forgo information: Evidence from the lab",
abstract = "We investigate subjects{\textquoteright} decisions to forgo costless information in interactive situations through laboratory experiments utilizing both within-subject and between-subjects designs. We created three strategic environments, each with two games: one environment with games of common interests, one with games of conflicting interests, and a third with one game of each type. In each environment, participants were paired and presented with the two games. They were then asked individually to choose whether or not to learn (at no cost) which game was being played. This choice was communicated to the other player before the actual game was played. Our results indicate that subjects understand the potential negative value of information in interactive contexts; specifically, they recognize that forgoing information can induce their counterpart to play more cooperatively. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the observed tendency to forgo information aligns with the predictions of rational behavior.",
author = "E. Kandel and Y. Mugerman and E. Winter",
year = "2025",
month = mar,
day = "31",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.007",
language = "English",
volume = "150",
pages = "401--414",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "ELSEVIER ACADEMIC PRESS INC",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Strategic commitment to forgo information

T2 - Evidence from the lab

AU - Kandel, E.

AU - Mugerman, Y.

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 2025/3/31

Y1 - 2025/3/31

N2 - We investigate subjects’ decisions to forgo costless information in interactive situations through laboratory experiments utilizing both within-subject and between-subjects designs. We created three strategic environments, each with two games: one environment with games of common interests, one with games of conflicting interests, and a third with one game of each type. In each environment, participants were paired and presented with the two games. They were then asked individually to choose whether or not to learn (at no cost) which game was being played. This choice was communicated to the other player before the actual game was played. Our results indicate that subjects understand the potential negative value of information in interactive contexts; specifically, they recognize that forgoing information can induce their counterpart to play more cooperatively. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the observed tendency to forgo information aligns with the predictions of rational behavior.

AB - We investigate subjects’ decisions to forgo costless information in interactive situations through laboratory experiments utilizing both within-subject and between-subjects designs. We created three strategic environments, each with two games: one environment with games of common interests, one with games of conflicting interests, and a third with one game of each type. In each environment, participants were paired and presented with the two games. They were then asked individually to choose whether or not to learn (at no cost) which game was being played. This choice was communicated to the other player before the actual game was played. Our results indicate that subjects understand the potential negative value of information in interactive contexts; specifically, they recognize that forgoing information can induce their counterpart to play more cooperatively. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the observed tendency to forgo information aligns with the predictions of rational behavior.

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.007

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.007

M3 - Journal article

VL - 150

SP - 401

EP - 414

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -