Rights statement: The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, The Antitrust Bulletin, 65 (3), 2020, © SAGE Publications Ltd, 2020 by SAGE Publications Ltd at the The Antitrust Bulletin page: https://journals.sagepub.com/home/abx on SAGE Journals Online: http://journals.sagepub.com/
Accepted author manuscript, 631 KB, PDF document
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Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
<mark>Journal publication date</mark> | 24/07/2020 |
---|---|
<mark>Journal</mark> | Antitrust Bulletin |
Issue number | 3 |
Volume | 65 |
Number of pages | 15 |
Pages (from-to) | 361-375 |
Publication Status | Published |
Early online date | 3/06/20 |
<mark>Original language</mark> | English |
The criminalization of cartel behavior in the UK turned attention to the criminal wrong at the heart of cartels. An understanding of the true nature of the cartel problem can also be used to develop a better understanding of Art 101 TFEU. This article uses the literature on the wrongfulness of cartels to examine how cartel behavior has the “object” of restricting competition within the terms of Art 101 TFEU. It pays particular attention to cases at the periphery of cartel behavior. The literature focuses on the importance of free markets as public institutions. Cartels are perceived as being a species of “cheating” which deserves opprobrium as it goes against the legitimate expectations of market participants. A reexamination of the cartel periphery cases involving information exchange and cartel facilitation using this lens shows a novel understanding of how these cases fit within the Art 101 TFEU “object box.”