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Tullock’s contest with reimbursements

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

<mark>Journal publication date</mark>10/2009
<mark>Journal</mark>Public Choice
Issue number1-2
Number of pages15
Pages (from-to)49-63
Publication StatusPublished
<mark>Original language</mark>English


We consider Tullock’s contest with reimbursements. It turns out that the winner-reimbursed contest maximizes net total spending while the loser-reimbursed contest minimizes net total spending. We investigate properties of contests with reimbursements and compare them with Tullock’s classic contest. Applications for R&D, government contracts, and elections are discussed.