Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Tullock’s contest with reimbursements

Electronic data

Links

Text available via DOI:

View graph of relations

Tullock’s contest with reimbursements

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Published

Standard

Tullock’s contest with reimbursements. / Matros, Alexander; Armanios, Daniel.

In: Public Choice, Vol. 141, No. 1-2, 10.2009, p. 49-63.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Matros, A & Armanios, D 2009, 'Tullock’s contest with reimbursements', Public Choice, vol. 141, no. 1-2, pp. 49-63. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9436-9

APA

Vancouver

Author

Matros, Alexander ; Armanios, Daniel. / Tullock’s contest with reimbursements. In: Public Choice. 2009 ; Vol. 141, No. 1-2. pp. 49-63.

Bibtex

@article{46dd74d0d749476399998592d2d16180,
title = "Tullock{\textquoteright}s contest with reimbursements",
abstract = "We consider Tullock{\textquoteright}s contest with reimbursements. It turns out that the winner-reimbursed contest maximizes net total spending while the loser-reimbursed contest minimizes net total spending. We investigate properties of contests with reimbursements and compare them with Tullock{\textquoteright}s classic contest. Applications for R&D, government contracts, and elections are discussed.",
keywords = "Contests, Reimbursement , D72, D74",
author = "Alexander Matros and Daniel Armanios",
year = "2009",
month = oct,
doi = "10.1007/s11127-009-9436-9",
language = "English",
volume = "141",
pages = "49--63",
journal = "Public Choice",
issn = "0048-5829",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "1-2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Tullock’s contest with reimbursements

AU - Matros, Alexander

AU - Armanios, Daniel

PY - 2009/10

Y1 - 2009/10

N2 - We consider Tullock’s contest with reimbursements. It turns out that the winner-reimbursed contest maximizes net total spending while the loser-reimbursed contest minimizes net total spending. We investigate properties of contests with reimbursements and compare them with Tullock’s classic contest. Applications for R&D, government contracts, and elections are discussed.

AB - We consider Tullock’s contest with reimbursements. It turns out that the winner-reimbursed contest maximizes net total spending while the loser-reimbursed contest minimizes net total spending. We investigate properties of contests with reimbursements and compare them with Tullock’s classic contest. Applications for R&D, government contracts, and elections are discussed.

KW - Contests

KW - Reimbursement

KW - D72

KW - D74

U2 - 10.1007/s11127-009-9436-9

DO - 10.1007/s11127-009-9436-9

M3 - Journal article

VL - 141

SP - 49

EP - 63

JO - Public Choice

JF - Public Choice

SN - 0048-5829

IS - 1-2

ER -