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Using Threat Analysis Techniques to Guide Formal Verification: A Case Study of Cooperative Awareness Messages

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNConference contribution/Paperpeer-review

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Using Threat Analysis Techniques to Guide Formal Verification: A Case Study of Cooperative Awareness Messages. / Farrell, Marie; Bradbury, Matthew; Fisher, Michael et al.
Software Engineering and Formal Methods: 17th International Conference, SEFM 2019, Oslo, Norway, September 18–20, 2019, Proceedings. ed. / Peter Csaba Ölveczky; Gwen Salaün. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. p. 471-490 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science ; Vol. 11724).

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNConference contribution/Paperpeer-review

Harvard

Farrell, M, Bradbury, M, Fisher, M, Dennis, LA, Dixon, C, Yuan, H & Maple, C 2019, Using Threat Analysis Techniques to Guide Formal Verification: A Case Study of Cooperative Awareness Messages. in PC Ölveczky & G Salaün (eds), Software Engineering and Formal Methods: 17th International Conference, SEFM 2019, Oslo, Norway, September 18–20, 2019, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science , vol. 11724, Springer International Publishing, Cham, pp. 471-490. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30446-1_25

APA

Farrell, M., Bradbury, M., Fisher, M., Dennis, L. A., Dixon, C., Yuan, H., & Maple, C. (2019). Using Threat Analysis Techniques to Guide Formal Verification: A Case Study of Cooperative Awareness Messages. In P. C. Ölveczky, & G. Salaün (Eds.), Software Engineering and Formal Methods: 17th International Conference, SEFM 2019, Oslo, Norway, September 18–20, 2019, Proceedings (pp. 471-490). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science ; Vol. 11724). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30446-1_25

Vancouver

Farrell M, Bradbury M, Fisher M, Dennis LA, Dixon C, Yuan H et al. Using Threat Analysis Techniques to Guide Formal Verification: A Case Study of Cooperative Awareness Messages. In Ölveczky PC, Salaün G, editors, Software Engineering and Formal Methods: 17th International Conference, SEFM 2019, Oslo, Norway, September 18–20, 2019, Proceedings. Cham: Springer International Publishing. 2019. p. 471-490. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science ). doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-30446-1_25

Author

Farrell, Marie ; Bradbury, Matthew ; Fisher, Michael et al. / Using Threat Analysis Techniques to Guide Formal Verification : A Case Study of Cooperative Awareness Messages. Software Engineering and Formal Methods: 17th International Conference, SEFM 2019, Oslo, Norway, September 18–20, 2019, Proceedings. editor / Peter Csaba Ölveczky ; Gwen Salaün. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2019. pp. 471-490 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science ).

Bibtex

@inproceedings{420155d58b2b4f04a85794ee2fb8e8bc,
title = "Using Threat Analysis Techniques to Guide Formal Verification: A Case Study of Cooperative Awareness Messages",
abstract = "Autonomous robotic systems such as Connected and Autonomous Vehicle (CAV) systems are both safety-and security-critical, since a breach in system security may impact safety. Generally, safety and security concerns for such systems are treated separately during the development process. In this paper, we consider an algorithm for sending Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs) between vehicles in a CAV system and the use of CAMs in preventing vehicle collisions. We employ threat analysis techniques that are commonly used in the cyber security domain to guide our formal verification. This allows us to focus our formal methods on those security properties that are particularly important and to consider both safety and security in tandem. Our analysis centres on identifying STRIDE security properties and we illustrate how these can be formalised, and subsequently verified, using a combination of formal tools for distinct aspects, namely Promela/SPIN and Dafny.",
author = "Marie Farrell and Matthew Bradbury and Michael Fisher and Dennis, {Louise A.} and Clare Dixon and Hu Yuan and Carsten Maple",
year = "2019",
month = sep,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-30446-1_25",
language = "English",
isbn = "9783030304454",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science ",
publisher = "Springer International Publishing",
pages = "471--490",
editor = "{\"O}lveczky, {Peter Csaba} and Gwen Sala{\"u}n",
booktitle = "Software Engineering and Formal Methods",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - Using Threat Analysis Techniques to Guide Formal Verification

T2 - A Case Study of Cooperative Awareness Messages

AU - Farrell, Marie

AU - Bradbury, Matthew

AU - Fisher, Michael

AU - Dennis, Louise A.

AU - Dixon, Clare

AU - Yuan, Hu

AU - Maple, Carsten

PY - 2019/9/1

Y1 - 2019/9/1

N2 - Autonomous robotic systems such as Connected and Autonomous Vehicle (CAV) systems are both safety-and security-critical, since a breach in system security may impact safety. Generally, safety and security concerns for such systems are treated separately during the development process. In this paper, we consider an algorithm for sending Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs) between vehicles in a CAV system and the use of CAMs in preventing vehicle collisions. We employ threat analysis techniques that are commonly used in the cyber security domain to guide our formal verification. This allows us to focus our formal methods on those security properties that are particularly important and to consider both safety and security in tandem. Our analysis centres on identifying STRIDE security properties and we illustrate how these can be formalised, and subsequently verified, using a combination of formal tools for distinct aspects, namely Promela/SPIN and Dafny.

AB - Autonomous robotic systems such as Connected and Autonomous Vehicle (CAV) systems are both safety-and security-critical, since a breach in system security may impact safety. Generally, safety and security concerns for such systems are treated separately during the development process. In this paper, we consider an algorithm for sending Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs) between vehicles in a CAV system and the use of CAMs in preventing vehicle collisions. We employ threat analysis techniques that are commonly used in the cyber security domain to guide our formal verification. This allows us to focus our formal methods on those security properties that are particularly important and to consider both safety and security in tandem. Our analysis centres on identifying STRIDE security properties and we illustrate how these can be formalised, and subsequently verified, using a combination of formal tools for distinct aspects, namely Promela/SPIN and Dafny.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-30446-1_25

DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-30446-1_25

M3 - Conference contribution/Paper

SN - 9783030304454

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

SP - 471

EP - 490

BT - Software Engineering and Formal Methods

A2 - Ölveczky, Peter Csaba

A2 - Salaün, Gwen

PB - Springer International Publishing

CY - Cham

ER -