Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Voting and vetoing

Text available via DOI:

View graph of relations

Voting and vetoing

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Published
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>1996
<mark>Journal</mark>American Political Science Review
Issue number4
Volume90
Number of pages11
Pages (from-to)813-823
Publication StatusPublished
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

The consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the appro ach of noncooperative bargaining theory. It is first shown that in equilibrium nonveto players do not share in the benefits gained by the decision making of the committee, that is, in every equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game, nonveto players earn zero. Some measures for reducing the excessive power of veto members in committees are analyzed. Specifically, I study the effects of imposing a deadline on negotiations and of expanding the committee by increasing the number of nonveto players. Quantitative results are given for the case of the UN Security Council.