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Voting and vetoing

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Voting and vetoing. / Winter, E.
In: American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 4, 1996, p. 813-823.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Winter, E 1996, 'Voting and vetoing', American Political Science Review, vol. 90, no. 4, pp. 813-823. https://doi.org/10.2307/2945844

APA

Winter, E. (1996). Voting and vetoing. American Political Science Review, 90(4), 813-823. https://doi.org/10.2307/2945844

Vancouver

Winter E. Voting and vetoing. American Political Science Review. 1996;90(4):813-823. doi: 10.2307/2945844

Author

Winter, E. / Voting and vetoing. In: American Political Science Review. 1996 ; Vol. 90, No. 4. pp. 813-823.

Bibtex

@article{c966c9cf8e2d48308b5a3f8a3611bb1f,
title = "Voting and vetoing",
abstract = "The consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the appro ach of noncooperative bargaining theory. It is first shown that in equilibrium nonveto players do not share in the benefits gained by the decision making of the committee, that is, in every equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game, nonveto players earn zero. Some measures for reducing the excessive power of veto members in committees are analyzed. Specifically, I study the effects of imposing a deadline on negotiations and of expanding the committee by increasing the number of nonveto players. Quantitative results are given for the case of the UN Security Council.",
author = "E. Winter",
year = "1996",
doi = "10.2307/2945844",
language = "English",
volume = "90",
pages = "813--823",
journal = "American Political Science Review",
issn = "0003-0554",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Voting and vetoing

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 1996

Y1 - 1996

N2 - The consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the appro ach of noncooperative bargaining theory. It is first shown that in equilibrium nonveto players do not share in the benefits gained by the decision making of the committee, that is, in every equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game, nonveto players earn zero. Some measures for reducing the excessive power of veto members in committees are analyzed. Specifically, I study the effects of imposing a deadline on negotiations and of expanding the committee by increasing the number of nonveto players. Quantitative results are given for the case of the UN Security Council.

AB - The consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the appro ach of noncooperative bargaining theory. It is first shown that in equilibrium nonveto players do not share in the benefits gained by the decision making of the committee, that is, in every equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game, nonveto players earn zero. Some measures for reducing the excessive power of veto members in committees are analyzed. Specifically, I study the effects of imposing a deadline on negotiations and of expanding the committee by increasing the number of nonveto players. Quantitative results are given for the case of the UN Security Council.

U2 - 10.2307/2945844

DO - 10.2307/2945844

M3 - Journal article

VL - 90

SP - 813

EP - 823

JO - American Political Science Review

JF - American Political Science Review

SN - 0003-0554

IS - 4

ER -