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Why we do not perceive aesthetic properties

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Why we do not perceive aesthetic properties. / Todd, Cain.

Mind, values and metaphysics: philosophical papers dedicated to Kevin Mulligan . ed. / Anne Reboul. Vol. 2 Springer, 2014. p. 105-117.

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNChapter

Harvard

Todd, C 2014, Why we do not perceive aesthetic properties. in A Reboul (ed.), Mind, values and metaphysics: philosophical papers dedicated to Kevin Mulligan . vol. 2, Springer, pp. 105-117. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05146-8_7

APA

Todd, C. (2014). Why we do not perceive aesthetic properties. In A. Reboul (Ed.), Mind, values and metaphysics: philosophical papers dedicated to Kevin Mulligan (Vol. 2, pp. 105-117). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05146-8_7

Vancouver

Todd C. Why we do not perceive aesthetic properties. In Reboul A, editor, Mind, values and metaphysics: philosophical papers dedicated to Kevin Mulligan . Vol. 2. Springer. 2014. p. 105-117 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05146-8_7

Author

Todd, Cain. / Why we do not perceive aesthetic properties. Mind, values and metaphysics: philosophical papers dedicated to Kevin Mulligan . editor / Anne Reboul. Vol. 2 Springer, 2014. pp. 105-117

Bibtex

@inbook{f3abd484b0554c939c1ef1b6dabdf398,
title = "Why we do not perceive aesthetic properties",
abstract = "This chapter examines whether there are genuine cases of aesthetic perception, and hence whether aesthetic judgements depend on the perception of aesthetic properties. My response will be negative. Specifically, I will argue that although our access to aesthetic {\textquoteleft}properties{\textquoteright} does appear to resemble perception in certain respects, it differs in two key ways from cases of ordinary everyday perception: (a) in its opacity (i.e. its lacking transparency) and (b) in its partly nonattributive phenomenology.",
keywords = "Perception, Aesthetic, Properties, Phenomenology, Evaluative",
author = "Cain Todd",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-05146-8_7",
language = "English",
isbn = "9783319051451",
volume = "2",
pages = "105--117",
editor = "Anne Reboul",
booktitle = "Mind, values and metaphysics",
publisher = "Springer",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Why we do not perceive aesthetic properties

AU - Todd, Cain

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - This chapter examines whether there are genuine cases of aesthetic perception, and hence whether aesthetic judgements depend on the perception of aesthetic properties. My response will be negative. Specifically, I will argue that although our access to aesthetic ‘properties’ does appear to resemble perception in certain respects, it differs in two key ways from cases of ordinary everyday perception: (a) in its opacity (i.e. its lacking transparency) and (b) in its partly nonattributive phenomenology.

AB - This chapter examines whether there are genuine cases of aesthetic perception, and hence whether aesthetic judgements depend on the perception of aesthetic properties. My response will be negative. Specifically, I will argue that although our access to aesthetic ‘properties’ does appear to resemble perception in certain respects, it differs in two key ways from cases of ordinary everyday perception: (a) in its opacity (i.e. its lacking transparency) and (b) in its partly nonattributive phenomenology.

KW - Perception

KW - Aesthetic

KW - Properties

KW - Phenomenology

KW - Evaluative

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-05146-8_7

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-05146-8_7

M3 - Chapter

SN - 9783319051451

VL - 2

SP - 105

EP - 117

BT - Mind, values and metaphysics

A2 - Reboul, Anne

PB - Springer

ER -