Standard
Threshold FlipThem: when the winner does not need to take all. /
Leslie, David; Sherfield, Chris L.; Smart, Nigel P.
Decision and Game Theory for Security : 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, London, UK, November 4-5, 2015, Proceedings. ed. / M.H.R. Khouzani; Emmanouil Panaousis; George Theodorakopoulos. Cham: Springer, 2015. p. 74-92 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 9406).
Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSN › Conference contribution/Paper › peer-review
Harvard
Leslie, D, Sherfield, CL & Smart, NP 2015,
Threshold FlipThem: when the winner does not need to take all. in MHR Khouzani, E Panaousis & G Theodorakopoulos (eds),
Decision and Game Theory for Security : 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, London, UK, November 4-5, 2015, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 9406, Springer, Cham, pp. 74-92.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_5
APA
Leslie, D., Sherfield, C. L., & Smart, N. P. (2015).
Threshold FlipThem: when the winner does not need to take all. In M. H. R. Khouzani, E. Panaousis, & G. Theodorakopoulos (Eds.),
Decision and Game Theory for Security : 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, London, UK, November 4-5, 2015, Proceedings (pp. 74-92). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 9406). Springer.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_5
Vancouver
Leslie D, Sherfield CL, Smart NP.
Threshold FlipThem: when the winner does not need to take all. In Khouzani MHR, Panaousis E, Theodorakopoulos G, editors, Decision and Game Theory for Security : 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, London, UK, November 4-5, 2015, Proceedings. Cham: Springer. 2015. p. 74-92. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_5
Author
Leslie, David ; Sherfield, Chris L. ; Smart, Nigel P. /
Threshold FlipThem : when the winner does not need to take all. Decision and Game Theory for Security : 6th International Conference, GameSec 2015, London, UK, November 4-5, 2015, Proceedings. editor / M.H.R. Khouzani ; Emmanouil Panaousis ; George Theodorakopoulos. Cham : Springer, 2015. pp. 74-92 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science).
Bibtex
@inproceedings{0b4b60c7f0be4f78b0ff6c73d5fa39b2,
title = "Threshold FlipThem: when the winner does not need to take all",
abstract = "We examine a FlipIt game in which there are multiple resources whicha monolithic attacker is trying to compromise. This extension to FlipIt was considered in a paper in GameSec 2014, and was there called FlipThem. Our analysis of such a situation is focused on the situation where the attacker{\textquoteright}s goal is to compromise a threshold of the resources. We use our game theoretic model to enable a defender to choose the correct configuration of resources (number of resources and the threshold) so as to ensure that it makes no sense for a rational adversary to try to attack the system. This selection is made on the basis of the relative costs of the attacker and the defender.",
author = "David Leslie and Sherfield, {Chris L.} and Smart, {Nigel P.}",
year = "2015",
month = nov,
day = "12",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_5",
language = "English",
isbn = "9783319255934",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science",
publisher = "Springer",
pages = "74--92",
editor = "M.H.R. Khouzani and Emmanouil Panaousis and George Theodorakopoulos",
booktitle = "Decision and Game Theory for Security",
}
RIS
TY - GEN
T1 - Threshold FlipThem
T2 - when the winner does not need to take all
AU - Leslie, David
AU - Sherfield, Chris L.
AU - Smart, Nigel P.
PY - 2015/11/12
Y1 - 2015/11/12
N2 - We examine a FlipIt game in which there are multiple resources whicha monolithic attacker is trying to compromise. This extension to FlipIt was considered in a paper in GameSec 2014, and was there called FlipThem. Our analysis of such a situation is focused on the situation where the attacker’s goal is to compromise a threshold of the resources. We use our game theoretic model to enable a defender to choose the correct configuration of resources (number of resources and the threshold) so as to ensure that it makes no sense for a rational adversary to try to attack the system. This selection is made on the basis of the relative costs of the attacker and the defender.
AB - We examine a FlipIt game in which there are multiple resources whicha monolithic attacker is trying to compromise. This extension to FlipIt was considered in a paper in GameSec 2014, and was there called FlipThem. Our analysis of such a situation is focused on the situation where the attacker’s goal is to compromise a threshold of the resources. We use our game theoretic model to enable a defender to choose the correct configuration of resources (number of resources and the threshold) so as to ensure that it makes no sense for a rational adversary to try to attack the system. This selection is made on the basis of the relative costs of the attacker and the defender.
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_5
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_5
M3 - Conference contribution/Paper
SN - 9783319255934
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science
SP - 74
EP - 92
BT - Decision and Game Theory for Security
A2 - Khouzani, M.H.R.
A2 - Panaousis, Emmanouil
A2 - Theodorakopoulos, George
PB - Springer
CY - Cham
ER -
