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Research output: Working paper
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TY - UNPB
T1 - Why don't all firms do 'good' equally?
AU - Banerjee, Shantanu
AU - Homroy, Swarnodeep
AU - Slechten, Aurelie Cecile Dominique
PY - 2016/5
Y1 - 2016/5
N2 - This paper shows that di¤erence in equity holding structure leads to heterogeneous firm preference for investing in social capital (CSR). In our theoretical model managerial and customer preferences jointly influence CSR investments. We show that if managerial preference is high, social investments of firms are higher, independent of customer preference. We test our theoretical predications using data from Indian firms. We show that firms with concentrated shareholding invest more in CSR. Firms with dispersed shareholding increase social investments if they export to the United States and the European Union, but they decrease these expenses in reaction to antidumping penalties.
AB - This paper shows that di¤erence in equity holding structure leads to heterogeneous firm preference for investing in social capital (CSR). In our theoretical model managerial and customer preferences jointly influence CSR investments. We show that if managerial preference is high, social investments of firms are higher, independent of customer preference. We test our theoretical predications using data from Indian firms. We show that firms with concentrated shareholding invest more in CSR. Firms with dispersed shareholding increase social investments if they export to the United States and the European Union, but they decrease these expenses in reaction to antidumping penalties.
KW - Controlling Stakeholding
KW - Public Goods
KW - Corporate Social Responsibility
M3 - Working paper
T3 - Economics working paper series
BT - Why don't all firms do 'good' equally?
PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics
CY - Lancaster
ER -