Accepted author manuscript, 1.1 MB, PDF document
Available under license: CC BY: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Firm‐Level Political Risk and Credit Markets
AU - Gad, Mahmoud
AU - Nikolaev, Valeri
AU - van Lent , Laurence
AU - Tahoun, Ahmed
PY - 2024/4/1
Y1 - 2024/4/1
N2 - We take advantage of a new composite measure of political risk (Hassan et al., 2019) to study the effects of firm-level political risk on private debt markets. First, we use panel data tests and exploit the redrawing of US congressional districts to uncover plausibly exogenous variation in firm-level political risk. We show that borrowers’ political risk is linked to interest rates set by lenders. Second, we test for the transmission of political risk from lenders to borrowers. We predict and find that lender-level political risk propagates to borrowers through lending relationships. Our analysis allows for endogenous matching between lenders and borrowers and indicates the presence of network effects in diffusing political risk throughout the economy. Finally, we introduce new text-based methods to analyze the distinct sources of political risk to lenders and borrowers and provide textual evidence of the transmission of political risk from lenders to borrowers.
AB - We take advantage of a new composite measure of political risk (Hassan et al., 2019) to study the effects of firm-level political risk on private debt markets. First, we use panel data tests and exploit the redrawing of US congressional districts to uncover plausibly exogenous variation in firm-level political risk. We show that borrowers’ political risk is linked to interest rates set by lenders. Second, we test for the transmission of political risk from lenders to borrowers. We predict and find that lender-level political risk propagates to borrowers through lending relationships. Our analysis allows for endogenous matching between lenders and borrowers and indicates the presence of network effects in diffusing political risk throughout the economy. Finally, we introduce new text-based methods to analyze the distinct sources of political risk to lenders and borrowers and provide textual evidence of the transmission of political risk from lenders to borrowers.
KW - Credit markets
KW - Earnings calls
KW - Financial institutions
KW - Political risk
U2 - 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101642
DO - 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101642
M3 - Journal article
VL - 77
JO - Journal of Accounting and Economics
JF - Journal of Accounting and Economics
SN - 0165-4101
IS - 2-3
M1 - 101642
ER -